Pinto a specific minority language requires the state to put significant resources into supporting this language.
In the absence of unlimited economic resources in most multilingual states, the positive dimension of language rights is inherently connected to another distinctive characteristic of language rights, which I will call 'the selective nature of language rights'. Most countries can only provide comprehensive legal protection for a few minority languages. A multilingual state has to 'choose' one or two minority languages to which it offers strong legal protection such as access to state services, governmental and municipal publications, public education and the like.
My paper addresses the normative criteria for selecting the minority languages most deserving of comprehensive protection by the state. This normative issue is frequently raised in domestic and international constitutional debates about language rights.* The question was also recently discussed by the Israeli Supreme Court decision in the controversial case of A d~l a h .~ When addressing the normative problem of minority languages most deserving of protection, will Kymlicka distinguishes between national and immigrant minorities. Many scholars challenge Kyrnlicka's distinction on empirical, normative and methodological grounds. However, none of them have suggested different criteria for distinguishing minority languages that are entitled to protection from minority languages that are less entitled to protection. In this paper, I suggest an alternative distinction between linguistic minorities, which is based on Denise Reaume's account of the intrinsic interest in language as a marker of cultural identity.
Using Joseph Raz's interest theory of rights, I claim that we should comparatively evaluate the interests of different linguistic minorities in protecting their languages. In the absence of unlimited resources, the minority that possesses the strongest interest in its language deserves the strongest protection. Language rights should therefore protect first minority languages whose speakers have the strongest interest in their language as a marker of cultural identity.
4. Canada's public policy has always distinguished between linguistic minorities by promoting multiculturalisrn on the one hand and bilingualism on the other hand. The prominent bases for preferring French and English over other languages in Canada are the historical reality of these two founding nations and their numerical and geographical concentration. However, there is a constant debate over protecting only these two linguistic communities (see Terrence Meyerhoff, "Notes and Comment: Multiculturalism and Language Rights in Canada: Problems and Prospects for Equality and Unity" (1994) 9 Pun. U.J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 9 1 3 Pierre A. Coulombe, "Citizenship and Official Bilingualism in Canada" in Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, eds., Citizenship in Diverse Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 273). This debate reached its climax in the public deliberation over the Meech Lake (1987) and Charlottetown (1992) Accolds. The bilingual character of Canada and the proposed 'distinct society clause' gave the French minority a preferable status over other minorities. Ethnic minorities and Aboriginal Peoples rejected the accords, inter alia, because they did not extend language rights to ethnic minorities: but instead, they maintained the disparity between minority groups (Meyerhoff, . For other reasons for rejecting the accords see Joel Baken & Michael Smith, "Rights, Nationalism, and Social Movements in Canadian Constitutional Politics" in David Schneiderman & Kate Sutherland, eds.,
Charting the Consequences; The Impact of C)iarter Rights on Canadian Law and Politics
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 2 18. Israel serves as a linguistic 'test case' for my normative distinction. Israel presents a complex case of a country consisting of a national Jewish majority, a national Arab minority, and a large Jewish Russian immigrant minority, which tends to adhere to its Russian culture and language. However, Israel has only two official languages: Hebrew and Arabic. Is this legal state of affairs normatively justified? Applying the theoretical framework I have developed, I compare the interest of the Arab minority in protecting Arabic with the interest of the Russian linguistic minority in protecting Russian. I argue that the interest of the Arab minority is stronger, because Arabic is its exclusive marker of cultural identity, whereas both Hebrew and Russian may serve as markers of cultural identity for the Jewish Russian minority.
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One may argue that Israel presents an unusually complex case of language rights that cannot be found in other multilingual states. Therefore, so the argument goes, we should be satisfied with Kymlicka's distinction. We do not need to appeal to an alternative normative criterion which distinguishes between linguistic minorities that deserve language protection. However, when one thinks about complicated multicultural situations in other states in the world one may discover similar complexities. One can think of such similar complexity in Canada which declares only French and English as official languages although there are other languages, such as Chinese, which are spoken by large communities of people in Canada.'j
Kymlicka's Distinction between National and Immigrant Minorities
Kymlicka's core thesis is that people have an important interest in access to their culture because it constitutes their context of meaningful choice.' Kymlicka thinks that individual rights are not enough to ensure protection of minority cultures. Therefore, cultural minorities should be accorded group-specific right^.^ For Kyrnlicka, group-specific rights include three forms of rights which protect minorities' access to their culture to different extents: self-government rights, representation rights, and polyethnic rights.
Representation rights purport to make it possible for the minority group's views and interests to be effectively represented.' They include affirmative action rights, and rights to allocations of budgets and cultural assets such as language rights and state symbol^.'^ Polyethnic rights protect a minority culture to a much lesser extent. LexisNexis Buttenvorths, 2006) 235 at 236. In contrast to Canada and Israel, India does not give any superior legal status to the Urdu language over other minority languages that are recognized as 'scheduled languages', i.e. official languages which are not transnational languages, and are not equal in status to the transnational Hindu and English. This is even though Urdu is used by the largest minority in India-the Muslim (see Ayelet Harel-Shalev, "The Status of Minority Languages in Deeply Divided Societies: Urdu in India and Arabic in Israel-A Comparative Perspective" (2006) 2 l(2) Israel Studies Forum 28 at 34-38). 7. I will elaborate on Kymlicka's core thesis in section V1 of this paper. 8. Will Kymlicka, Mztlticultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1995) at 27 [Kymlicka?
M~~lticultural Citizenship]. 9. Ibid. at 32. 10. Kymlicka discusses self-government and representation rights under the same title of 'groupdifferentiated rights' (ibid. at 109). He sees group-differentiated rights as instruments that alleviate They aim to challenge the assumption that cultural minorities should completely abandon all aspects of their ethnic heritage and assimilate to existing cultural norms and customs." The negative dimensions of polyethnic rights include the right of cultural minority members to freely express their particularity without fear of prejudice or discrimination and the right to association.12 The positive dimensions of polyethnic rights include steps that aim to eradicate discrimination and prejudice such as anti-racism policies, and public funding of minorities' cultural practices." In Kymlicka's eyes, polyethnic rights are to be accorded to immigrant minorities--cultural groups whose members emigrated from their origin state to a new state, whereas representation rights should be given to national minoritiesgroups whose homeland has been incorporated into a new state through conquest, colonization, or federation.14 Where does the entitlement to language protection fit into Kymlicka's scheme? The way to recognize national minorities' languages is to ensure that all national groups have the opportunity to maintain themselves as distinct cult~res.'~ Thus, national minorities should be accorded language rights, which belong to Kyrnlicka's category of representation rights. In contrast, the accommodation of immigrant minorities takes only the form of providing language training,I6 which will enable immigrants to learn the language of the new country. In terms of linguistic integration, the goal should be that the immigrants will learn the dominant language of their new state, but there is no requirement for them to abandon their mother tongue.
Kymlicka suggests two arguments in order to justify his hierarchical distinction between ethnic immigrants and national minorities: the 'sociological argument' and the 'consent argument'." Within the sociological argument, Kyrnlicka observes that it is usually the culture of national minorities that takes the form of a societal culture. In Kymlicka's own words:
At the time of their incorporation, each group constituted an ongoing societal culture [. . . .] They did not have to re-create their culture in a new land, since their language and historical narratives were already embodied in a full set of social practices and institutions, encompassing all aspects of social life. These practices and institutions defined the range of socially meaninghl options for their members.Is the vulnerability of the minority to economic and political decisions made by the majority (ibid. j. for they allow the availability of meaningful options by providing access for members of minority groups to their societal cultures. Kymlicka defines group-differentiated rights as "external protections [that] ensure that members of the minority have the same opportunity to live and work in their own culture as members of the majority" (ibid. In contrast to national minorities, which form societal cultures, members of immigrant minorities are part of subcultures, i.e. cultures that lack the range of activity and institutions that characterize societal culture^.'^ Kymlicka therefore refers to members of immigrant minorities as persons who:
[Blring their language and historical narratives with them. But they have left behind the set of institutionalized practices, conducted in their mother tongue, which actually provided culturally significant ways of life to people in their original homeland. They bring with them a 'shared vocabulary of tradition and convention', but they have uprooted themselves from the social practices which this vocabulary originally referred to and made sense of.20
In Kymlicka's view, if a minority culture is to survive the majority culture pressure, it should be a societa! culture, which tends to be synonymous with national culture. Only nations have the capacity and motivation to form and maintain such a distinct c u l t~r e ,~' whereas immigrants typically do not, since they instead integrate into, and thereby enrich, the culture of the larger society.22
Kymlicka's consent argument is a moral observation regarding the motivation of immigrant minorities to leave their country of origin for a new state. According to Kymlicka, immigrants freely and voluntarily choose to leave their society and join another existing ~ociety.'~ Therefore, if they had the option to stay in their country of origin, but they decided not to do so, immigrant minorities should not expect to be given representation rights. Rather, they should expect to be given polyethnic rights that do not stand in the way of their integration into mainstream society. In Kymlicka's own words:
After all, most immigrants (as distinct from refugees) choose to leave their own culture. They have uprooted themselves, and they know when they come that their success, and that of their children, depends on integrating into the institutions of English-speaking society. The expectation of integration is not unjust, I believe, so long as immigrants had the option to stay in their original culture.24
Kymlicka's distinction between immigrant and national minorities may seem very appealing in the legal context of language rights. Kymlicka's consent argument in particular has great force as it accords with most people's moral intuition. A somewhat similar version of Kymlicka's distinction was implemented by Barak C.3. in an important and controversial case in Israel-the Adalah case.'' The legal analysis of the Adalah decision, which I will provide in the next section, maps 19 . Choudhry refers to these two differences as the difference of scope and the difference of institutional embodiment (Choudhry, siipra note 17 at 73 
The Israeli Supreme Court Case of Adalah
The case of Adalah, which was delivered by the Supreme Court of Israel three years ago, raises one of the most difficult questions in legal discourse about language rights in general and language rights specifically within the Israeli legal context. The facts and the special circumstances of Adalah created the need to provide a criterion to serve as the basis for addressing the normative question of which linguistic minority is most deserving of legal protection. This question has never been addressed by the Israeli Supreme Court before.26
The petitioners in Adalah argued that in a municipality with an Arab-minority population, municipal signs should be in Arabic in addition to Hebrew, not only in Hebrew." The petitioners' argument was based on constitutional principles as well as statutory interpretation. The statutory part focused on Article 82 of the Palestine Order-in-Council, 1922, which states that official notices and forms of the government and local authorities and municipalities "in areas to be prescribed by order of the government shall be published in Arabic and Hebrew"."
The majority of the Supreme Court (Barak C.J. and Domer J.) accepted the petition, and required the respondent municipalities to ensure that municipal signs in their communities be in both Hebrew and Arabic. According to Barak C.J, the duty of the respondent municipalities is determined by balancing several considerations. According to the first consideration,'* municipal signs should include Arabic captions so Arab residents are able to find their way within their city, to receive information and to be warned of traffic hazards and the like." Barak C.J. points out that this consideration is not very persuasive as other residents of the cities, who are not Arabs and speak other languages, may find it difficult to understand municipal signs in Hebrew rather than in their mother tongue." Barak C.J. then appeals to the positive dimension of the right to freedom of language and the right to equality and changes them from general rights, which impose a duty to protect all linguistic minorities in Israel, to what I have called 'selective' rights-rights which mainly protect one linguistic minority but not others. Barak C.J. performs this change by raising a distinctive argument on behalf of the Arab minority. In Barak CL'S own words:
Against this background the following question may arise: what distinguishes the Arabic language, and why is its status different from that of other languages-in addition to Hebrew-that Israelis speak? Does our approach not imply that residents of different towns in which there are minority groups of speakers of various languages, will now be able to demand that the signs in their towns will be in their language as well? My response is negative, since none of those languages is the same as Arabic. The uniqueness of the Arabic language is twofold. First, Arabic is the language of the largest minority in Israel, which has lived in Israel since far far in time. This is a language that is linked to cultural, historical, and religious attributes of the Arab minority group in Israel. This is the language of citizens who, notwithstanding the Arab-Israeli conflict, wish to live in Israel as loyal citizens with equal rights, amid respectfor their language and culture. The desire to ensure dignified coexistence between the descendants of our forefather Abraham, in mutual tolerance and equality, justifies recognizing the use of the Arabic language in urban signs-in those cities 60). In addition, Cheshin J. ruled that the petition lacks a minimal factual foundation because the petitioners did not show that Arab residents were indeed injured as a result of the lack of street signs in Arabic, and that the routine daily life of these citizens requires the addition of Arabic to the signs (441 -46). Justice Cheshin's latter view is not consistent with the intrinsic interest that underpins language rights (as I will analyze in section V1 of this paper). 30. Adalah, supra note 5 at 41 l . 31. You may ask why the legal status of Arabic is defined by an old British mandatory rule and why the democratic machinery in Israel failed to comprehensively protect the Arabic language. The answer is complex and therefore beyond the scope of this paper. In short, on the one hand most Knesset members do not want to abolish the official status of Arabic which has mainly a symbolic importance. On the other hand, comprehensive support for the Arabic language is viewed by the majority of Knesset members as derogating from the status of Hebrew, thus jeopardizing the Jewish national character of Israel. The argument is that supporting bilingualism means supporting bi-nationalism (see discussion in Saban & Amara, slrpra note 25 at 37). 32. Or the "functional value of a language" in Barak C.J.'s term (Adalah, supra note 5 at 4 12-13). 33. As Barak C.J. puts it: "Municipal signs are designated to 'talk' to the residences of the city and therefore should be published in a language that they understand" (ibid. at 412 Chief Justice Barak's distinction between the Arab minority which has lived in Israel "far far in time" and other linguistic minorities which have not, addresses the important problem of the linguistic minority most deserving of protection in Israel. I will use the Adalah decision as a springboard to discuss a nationwide topic that the court did not address. Is the philosophical argument for bilingual street signs strong enough to expand the rule to all relevant areas of governmental communication in the country even though the Adalah decision was limited to mixed cities with Arab and Jewish resident^?'^ It is not hard to imagine different dimensions of this problem which are likely to be raised in Israeli courts in the future. Suppose, for instance, a city which consists only of Hebrew-speaking residents. In which language should the city signs be written? Hebrew alone, or Hebrew and Arabic? Or, let us think, for instance, about nationwide communication of the government with all Israeli citizens. In which language should it be conducted? Hebrew alone, or Hebrew and Arabic? What about mixed cities which consist of Jewish residents who speak Hebrew and Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union? In which language should the city signs be written? Hebrew alone, or Hebrew and Russian? The question is whether in such situations the argument about the priority of Arabic as the language of the Arab national minority that has long existed in Israel is relevant or sufficient to justify the duty of the authorities to 'speak' bilingually in Hebrew as well as in Arabic, but not in another language such as Russian.
Chief Justice Barak's argument resonates with Kymlicka's distinction between national minorities and immigrant rninoritie~.~' Some Israeli scholars emphasised the similarities between the two arguments and the general applicability of Kymlicka's distinction to the Israeli context. Based on Kymlicka's distinction, they advocated demands for comprehensive language rights which protect the Arabic language.38 I shall therefore discuss defects in Kymlicka's distinction in order to evaluate Barak C.J.'s stance and suggest an alternative rationale for such demands which will be applicable in the Israeli context. 35 . The translation of this paragraph is taken from Saban & Amara, supra note 25 at 32 (emphasis added). 36. The fact that the decision was limited to street signs in mixed cities was emphasized in the decision of Justice Maza who refused the request of the respondents to a further hearing (see H.C.F.H. 7260102 The Municipality ofRamleh v. Adalah et al.
[2003] (The decision was not published)).
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More precisely, in my view, the distinction that was drawn by Barak C.J. is only partly similar to Kymlicka's distinction. The part describing the Arab minority as existing in Israel for a long time characterized it as a national minority in Kymlicka's terms. The other considerations relate more to the interest of maintaining a peaceful society in Israel and correspond to the correlating instrumental interest that will be discussed in section V1 of this paper. 
IV. Kymlicka's Distinction-Empirical, Normative & Methodological Flaws
In this section, I will present specific criticisms regarding Kymlicka's empirical and normative accounts, which stand at the basis of his sociological and consent arguments. With respect to Kymlicka's sociological argument, the prominent empirical difficulty concerns Kymlicka's categorical distinction between national minorities, which have their own societal culture and wish to maintain it, and immigrant minorities, which do not have a societal culture and seek integration with greater society. In practice, there are many groups that do not fit into either category. These groups lie somewhere on a continuum that stretches from Kymlicka's notion of national minorities to his notion of ethnic m i n~r i t i e s .~~ Therefore, fiom the empirical perspective, Kyrnlicka's sociological distinction between national and ethnic groups is grounded on an oversimplified account of reality that does not take into consideration the complexity and variety of national and immigrant minority groups.
Similar reservations were made by scholars with regard to the empirical basis of Kymlicka's consent argument. For example, Iris Young disputes one of Kyrnlicka's hndamental premises, arguing that it is not always the case that immigrant groups voluntarily choose to leave their home culture and assimilate to a new one. It is often the case that immigrants from poor countries are forced or compelled to leave their homeland in order to improve their economic standard of living. This does not necessarily mean that they wish to abandon their old ~ulture.'~ Kymlicka also fails to distinguish between inclusion in economic opportunity and decisionmaking, and inclusion in the dominant national culture. Many immigrant minorities welcome the former while rejecting the Iatters4'
On the normative level, Kymlicka's distinction between different kinds of rights is based on his distinction between national and ethnic minorities. In other words, Kymlicka's categorical distinction between national and ethnic minorities establishes a normative bias and prejudice regarding the type of rights every group should enjoy.42
Furthermore, it is not clear fiom Kymlicka's consent argument how polyethnic rights can be justified in the first place. We cannot assume that immigrants have consented to a less extensive scheme of cultural rights, for this assumption contradicts the liberal tradition, which holds that persons are only held responsible for states of affairs that arise from choices that are made freely." Because many people immigrate in search of economic opportunity, the argument that immigrant rninorities have waived their right to live in accordance with their own cultures through their decision to immigrate is a weak argument." In my view, while Kymlicka's consent argument may be weak with regard to extreme economic circumstances that lead to immigration, it may be stronger when immigrants look for a higher standard of living in a new state.
Sujit Choudhry points out the second problematic aspect in Kyrnlicka's argument of consent. It does not in itself specify the terms of polyethnic rights that immigrant minorities allegedly consent to. This is because polyethnic rights were not part of the implied agreement between immigrant minorities and their new state. On the contrary, immigrant minorities have 'consented' to total assimilation policies, not only to waive their rights to group rights. In other words, from a historical point of view, it is very clear that immigration to a new country leads to total cultural assirnilati~n.~~ Even if we assume that immigrants have given their implied consent to waive their right to live in accordance with their own culture, the same assumption will not necessarily be true with regard to their descendents. Children of immigrants should not be disadvantaged because of consent that their parents have allegedly given.46
In my view, the main problem with Kymlicka's distinction is its methodology, namely the way in which Kymlicka infers general normative conclusions from specific empirical facts. Kyrnlicka's theory suggests a general fi-amework for all liberal multilingual demo~racies.~' This problem is typical of a particular kind of a political theory which presents itself as trying to address universal and abiding matters which are true anywhere and anytime." Such an attitude leads to 'perfecting classroom visions' and abstraction, which are not successful in addressing the complexity of real life cases.49 A better way to write political theory is first to recognize the particularities of the cases at hand, rather than obscuring them, and second, to construct a more general whole out of the details, paying special attention to the similarities and dissimilarities between different cases, thus arriving at valid generalizations and moral arguments.50 44. Ibid. 45. ibid Choudhry raises another difficulty with the way in which Kymlicka derives normative conclusions from empirical facts. Kymlicka takes the insufficient institutional capacities of immigrant groups as factual givens and bases his argument of polyethnic rights around them. Kymlicka does so without taking into consideration that these institutional capacities may reflect the political disadvantage of immigrant rninoritie~.~' In other words, an argument on behalf of polyethnic rights to immigrant minorities cannot be justified by sociological facts alone as institutions are a hnction of rights, not the other way around.s2
In the following sections I will use the Israeli linguistic case to demonstrate flaws in Kymlicka's distinction and its irrelevance to the Israeli context. From the specifics of the Israeli linguistic case, a better normative distinction between linguistic minorities will emerge.
V. Is Kymlicka's Distinction Relevant to Israeli Linguistic Minorities?
Chief Justice Barak7s distinction between the status of Arabic and other languages that Israelis speak besides Hebrew was drawn in the AdaIah decision in light of the Israeli language context. In this context, there are two main linguistic minorities: the Arab and the Russian minority. In the following sub-section, I will depict the community life and linguistic practice of the Russian linguistic minority in Israel.
(Q Tize Russian Linguistic Mirlority in Israel-General Survey
Since its establishment, the state of Israel has conducted an 'open door7 policy regarding immigration for all Jews in the Diasporas who wish to immigrate to Israels3 (or, in Hebrew, to make an 'aliya'). From a cultural point of view, much like the Sephardic immigrants who came to Israel in the 19Sb~,~' the Russian Jewish irnrniirants are depicted as having a close contact with the Russian culture.60 In the 1950s a melting pot ideology ruled the cape in Israeli society. In contrast, in the 1990s, a more tolerant and multicultural ideology prevailed. Therefore, unlike the Sephardic immigrants who were encouraged to integrate into Israel's dominant Ashkenazi society by learning Hebrew and forgetting their linguistic root^,^' though the Russian immigrants were expected to become fluent in Hebrew, they insisted on preserving their culture and language and were also partly encouraged to do so by Israeli
The sociolinguistic literature mentions three prominent causes explaining the preservation of Russian in Israel. First, for generations, before they immigrated to Israel, the Jewish Russians had been deeply integrated into the social life of the former Soviet Union. This means that they acquired, internalized and identified with Russian culturea6' It was therefore only natural for them to preserve Russian language and culture in Israel too.
Second, the motivation of most of the Russian immigrants was economic or social pressure rather than adherence to Jewish values or culture.@ They chose to leave the former Soviet Union because of economic and social insecurity, caused by the changing regime in the former Soviet Union and the unstable state of affairs in the post-Soviet economy. They also feared the growing anti-Semitism and the rise of ultra-nationalistic groups in Russian politic^.^' --Moreover, many Russian immigrants chose to immigrate to Israel because they were prevented from immigrating to the United States or to Western E~r o p e .~ The option of 'dropping out' iia ~u r o~e a n state, which had been available t d~u s s i a n Jews who gained a visa to Israel but preferred the option of living in Europe, was no longer open to them. Only a very limited number of Russian Jews could apply for direct immigration to the United States; others had no choice but to go to Israel. Many Russian Jews were very disappointed because they feared the political instability in Israel and the continued military threat posed by the violent conflict with Israel's Arab neighbouring c o u n t r i e~.~~ The main reasons for the mass Jewish Russian immigration may be depicted as pragmatic rather than ideological. The Russian immigrants did not leave the Soviet Union in order to abandon their Russian cultural heritage. Therefore, on the face of it, they had no particular reason to embrace Israeli culture as a substitute for their own.69
Third, the massive numbers of Russian immigrants allow the community to be resilient towards linguistic and cultural shift, in particular where there is a density of population as it occurs in a number of towns such as Be'er-Sheva, Ashdod, Rishon LeZion, Bat-Yam and Haifa." Their massive numbers allow the Russian immigrants to keep their Russian linguistic and cultural environment alive in Israel.
Due to the above three reasons, Russian immigrants tend not to reject their Russian identity, which is expressed by the high status they attribute to the Russian language." They want to integrate into Israeli society and they willingly learn Hebrew, but they treat the Israeli culture as a distinct culture and tend to view the Russian culture as a precious culture that should be presewed.12 A sociolinguistic study that was conducted in 1992 shows that although Russian immigrants greatly appreciate the Hebrew language, they express a greater cultural appreciation for the Russian language." Therefore, there is a continued use of the Russian language, which supports the maintenance of Russian culture and economic life in Israel.
The use of the Russian language in Israel is supported by special efforts that aim to secure its constant use. Russian newspaper^,'^ television channels, shops, stayed at a transit station (Vienna in Austria or Italy) waiting for immigration to another country (Dominitz, supra note 53 at 1 18). Siegel mentions that "[flor many Soviet Jews Vienna was a symbol of the free choice of destination" (Siegel, supra note 65 at 15). However, Dominitz indicates that this free choice no longer existed during the mass immigration of the 1990s because the travel to Israel was done mostly by direct flights without using transit centres in other countries (Dominitz, suprn note 53 at 124). theatres, tailors and teacher^'^ are good examples of efforts of Russian language maintenance undertaken by the Russian linguistic minority. Russian immigrants maintain their language by reading newspapers and books because they can import these materials fiom the former Soviet Union and because they enjoy developing media in their language.'(' Banks and cellular phone companies, which are very dominant in the Israeli economy, that advertise their services in Russian are good examples of support of the Russian language, the source of which is outside the Russian linguistic minority. The Israeli government also responds to the cultural needs of the Russian immigrants by supporting access to their language. For example, health funds and other governmental offices, which deal directly with Russian immigrants, recruit Russian spealung employees because they found a sigmficant increase in efficiency by doing so." The fact that the Yellow Pages directory in Russian has been published annually since 1 99178 is perhaps the most prominent example of external public support that the Russian immigrants have received.
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All of this suggests that there is a strong support system for those Russians who choose to continue to use Russian.j9 In the private sector, it is easy to understand why commercial companies make efforts to learn their customers' language, but in public and governmental institutions there are generally no customers and the functionaries often feel no obligation to ease other Jewish immigrants' access to government ser~ices.~" Therefore, when public institutions make such efforts, these efforts should not be depicted only as efforts to ease the access of immigrants to public institutions. They are more accurately depicted as an indication of strong and positive support for language access policies, whether they are formally adhered to or not.
In conclusion, Russian immigrants tend to preserve their culture and to exercise their language in both the private and public spheres. Moreover, it seems that the maintenance of the Russian language in Israel is not a transitional phenomenon because research shows that Russian immigrants' children continue using Russian when coming in contact with their counterparts, and remain in close contact with the Russian culture in the former Soviet U n i~n .~' Therefore, although the word 'minority' is not commonly used in Israel with regard to the immigrants that came from the former Soviet Union, the language culture of Israel clearly proves that the Russian immigrants constitute a linguistic minority. As indicated by Bernard Spolsky and Elana Shohamy, Russian is known as the first or additional language spoken by more than a million Israelis, which makes it the second largest minority language in Israel after Arabicg2 
(ii) Specific Problenrs with Kyrr~licka 'S Distinction in the Israeli Lit~giiistic Context
On an empirical level, Kymlicka assumes that most exiting ethnic groups of immigrants are dispersed, assimilated and integrated,83 whereas most national minorities constitute comprehensive societal cultures. Moreover, within the consent element of his empirical argument, Kymlicka describes the process of immigration mostly as a process which resulted from individual and familial free choices to leave their former society and to join a new society. In my view, neither of Kymlicka's two empirical arguments is applicable in the Israeli linguistic context. As opposed to other kinds of immigrants that are described in Kymlicka's work, the sociological data that was discussed in the former sub-section -suggests that Russian immigrants constitute a quasi-societal culture. Russian immigrants cannot be described as separate individuals or families that come to Israel with the intention of fully integrating into Israeli culture, but rather they can be better described as a group with a strong loyalty to their culture of origin, including to their native language. Most of them are willing to learn Hebrew but not to forget or abandon their language. Therefore, the Russian linguistic minority lies in the grey area of irnmigrant groupssbnd constitutes a distinctive illustration of the validity of the continuum argument against Kymlicka's distinction.
Contrary to Kymlicka's observation, although constituting an ethnic minority, the Russian minority receives de facto public language recognition. As indicated in the former sub-section, the private and public markets in Israel respond to the loyalty of Russian immigrants to their culture by accommodating the Russian language. These modifications deviate from the modifications towards immigrant minorities that are described by K y m l i~k a .~~
The major modification carried out in Israel for the Russian immigrants has been the profound change in the linguistic policy of the public sector in Israel, which was depicted above. Not only does it aim to enable Russian immigrants to maintain their heritage without interference from the state, but it also involves positive support for the maintenance of their culture and language. It seems that these modifications purport to support a quasisocietal culture based on the immigrants' mother tongue, rather than only accommodating their ethnic differences. The important thing is that they involve, to some extent, the acknowledgment of the Russian language in the public sphere of Israel.
83. Kymlicka, M~rlticlrltural Citizenship, supra note 8 at 96. 84. As Kyrnlicka indicated himself, there is no magical formula that will cover all national and irnrnigrant minorities (Kymlicka, Multiclrltzrral Citizenship, slrpra note 8 at 101). Elsewhere, Kymlicka and Raphael Cohen-Almagor wrote that the distinction between immigrant groups and national minorities remains remarkably unexplored at the level of normative liberal democratic theory.
As a result there is no "adequate theory of the moral justification for, or the moral limitations As it was depicted above, the choice of Russian Jews to immigrate to Israel was not an entirely free decision. Many Russians would have preferred to immigrate to the United States or not to immigrate at all. It was the social and economic environment in the former Soviet Union that forced many of them to immigrate in the first place, and it was the closed doors of other democratic countries that caused many of them to immigrate to Israel.
However, because most choices are made under existing economic and social conditions, and because most important decisions are not entirely free, Kymlicka's consent argument about immigrants who freely choose to leave their country of origin and come to a new state is not entirely irrelevant to the Russian linguistic minority. I will therefore argue that because many immigrants preferred to immigrate to other states but were unable to do so, Kymlicka's consent argument is of limited relevance to the Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union. The more limited the range of options one has when choosing to immigrate to a new country, the weaker Kymlicka's consent argument is as a moral justification for asking irnmigrants to relinquish their language.
As for Choudhry's observation that from an historical point of view immigrant minorities should expect to totally assimilate to their new countries, in the Israeli context, it is hard to determine whether the Russian immigrants were expected to totally assimilate to Israeli society or not. On the one hand, Israeli history proved that Sephardic Jewish immigrants from Asia and Africa have been expected to assimilate into Ashkenazi majority culture.s6 On the other hand, when the mass Russian immigration took place in the 1990s, the criticism of the Sephardc 'melting pot' assimilation policy was at its peak.87
In conclusion, Kymlicka's theory does not provide an adequate normative basis for deciding which cultural groups in Israel should be accorded language rights. The following sections will provide an alternative account to Kymlicka's which will respond to the specific conditions in Israel, based on Denise Reaume's theory of the intrinsic value of language and Joseph Raz's theory of constituent intrinsic goods. This argument will provide a solid criterion that can be practically used in any other legal system.
VI. The Intrinsic Interests in Protecting One's Own Language
According to Joseph Raz, the right to X exists only if some person's interest constitutes a sufficient reason for holding others to be under a duty to provide or to secure X.$$ Following Raz's definition we ought to identify one or more interests in protecting particular languages that might be thought important enough to justify imposing duties on others." In this paper, 1 focus more on the intrinsic interest in one's own language rather than on instrumental interests. I will therefore briefly discuss the instrumental account of the value of one's mother tongue. This discussion will point at the importance of the intrinsic interest, which will be the basis for the distinction I will suggest between linguistic minorities in section VII. Viewed instrumentally, the use of a particular language is regarded as valuable because it is a tool, an instrument to achieve valuable human objectives. Viewed as a matter of intrinsic value, the use of a particular language is regarded as valuable on its own account and not because it promotes other valuable ends.
The obvious account of the instrumental interest in a specific language concentrates on the mundane and common practical value of any language which is a person's main form of communication. From an instrumental point of view, we should protect a specific language because people are less comfortable using other languages in their communication activitie~.~'
A different account of the instrumental interest in a specific language is Kymlicka's argument of language as a context of choice. According to Kymlicka, people are deeply connected to their own culture in the sense that their culture enables them to make meaningkl choices when they are confronted with questions about personal values and projects. People's capacity to form and revise their conception of the good is intimately tied to their membership in their own culture, since the process of deciding how to lead their lives is a matter of exploring the 89.1 will not discuss the aesthetic or the beneficial values of language as a human enterprise for human culture in general. Under these accounts, each particular language is compared to a rare piece of art (Alan Reaume points out that although these interests may be very important, they emphasize the value o f a particular language to human kind in general, and not its value to its particular speakers. Therefore, since they do not point out specific people who hold interests in a specific language they are too general to justify language rights (Reaume, "The Constitutional Protection of Language", silpra note 2 at 41). Following Reaume, I will leave aside those interests that pertain to language in general and confine my discussion in this paper to the interests of people in practicing their own particular language. 90. Leslie Green, "Are Language Rights Fundamental?" (1987) possibilities made available by their own ~ulture.~' Therefore, if individuals are entitled to protection of their ability to make meaninghl choices, their culture and the specific language that is attached to itY2 the context that makes this choice possible, deserves protection." Reaume rightly indicates that Kymlicka relies on the instrumental connection between the use of a particular language and the achievement of human ends, rather than on intrinsic connection." It is not that it is impossible for an individual to achieve these ends using a language other than his or her own, it is just harder for him or her to achieve them. In other words, one's own language is simply a better tool for accomplishing one's own independent objectives. Some scholars tend to overlook the instrumental character of Kymlicka's argument. Delving into the philosophical distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values will help us grasp the importance and the complexities of the intrinsic interest in a particular language. Under Raz's definitions, calling something an 'intrinsic good' indicates one's view that the matter in question has value not in terms of its consequences but in i t~e l f .~R a z discusses a particular kind of intrinsic goods+on-stituent goods. These are intrinsic goods that are elements of something that is an intrinsic good in itself. However, constituent goods have their value without regard to consequences or the existence of other things; they are part of the general class of intrinsic goods not a means to it; the relationship is not causal, it is internal. Raz gives the example of the constituent intrinsic value of works of art. When one thinks of "life with art" as an intrinsic good, one thinks of the existence of an artwork as a constituent part of such good. The value of the artwork is thus not as a thing having its value as an instrument to something else.96
It is important not to confuse constituent goods with instrumental goods. It may seem that both constituent intrinsic goods and instrumental goods are important components of other intrinsic goods. If we go back to Kymlicka's argument, practicing 91. Kymlicka, Multicultlrral Citizenship, supra note 8 at 82-83, 105. According to Geertz. culture is a system of symbols of human life and for it. It is of life in the sense that it is used by human beings to represent their lives in a meaningful way, and for life in the sense that it offers effective models for action (Geertz stresses that this framework is one's particular culture and not culture in general). The second sense is similar to Kymlicka's idea of culture as a framework which enables meaningful choice (Clifford Geertz, The Interpreration one's own language may seem to be a constituent intrinsic value of the ability to make meaningful choices, which is an intrinsic good.
Because of this possible confusion, I argue that Raz's categories should be refined in order to identify the intrinsic values of protecting specific languages and distinguish them from instrumental ones. Following Reaume's argument, I suggest refining Raz's definition of intrinsic goods as things that cannot be substituted for others. In particular, intrinsic constituent goods are things the replacement of which with other goods will result in a reduction or loss of the value of things that are valuable in them~elves.~' In other words, a constituent good is a type of intrinsic good in so far as it contributes an internal feature (rather than a cause) of a good which is intrinsically valuable.
According to this refined definition, in the context of language, the argument regarding the intrinsic value of a particular language may be phrased as follows: the intrinsic good of a specific culture will be less valued, or perhaps not valued at all, if it does not have one of its basic (i.e., constituent) elements, which is a particular language that is deeply attached to it.
Let us apply my suggested refined definition on the two instrumental values of language, which were discussed so far. Let us start from the first value, which is one's mother tongue as one's best means of communication. It may be argued that once one becomes fluent in a foreign language, the new foreign language may replace one's mother tongue as a means of communication. Since under this analysis, one's mother tongue is a good replaceable by another good, such as a foreign language, the interest in protecting one's mother tongue as one's best means of communication is an instrumental interest.
Let us turn back to Kymlicka's argument about language as a context of meaningf'ul choice. Kymlicka emphasises the difficulty of learning a foreign language. However, once one overcomes this difficulty by integrating into a new culture, one does not need one's original language in order to make meaningful choice. The should not be considered as having constituent intrinsic value, but rather as intrinsic goods that are valuable in themselves. As I see it, when people ascribe intrinsic value to their particular friends, they do not necessarily ascribe intrinsic value to friendship as such. Similarly, parents ascribe intrinsic value to their own children, but not necessarily to having children in general.
In the case of language, it seems that both speaking a language in general and speaking one's mother tongue have an independently intrinsic value for him or her.
newly acquired foreign language serves as an alternative means for achieving the goal of making meaningful choices. Therefore, Kymlicka actually ascribes an instrumental value to one's mother tongue language and not an intrinsic value. The refined definition of intrinsic good, which I have drawn from Raz's theory and Rkaume's argument, allows us to identify other accounts of the instrumental interest in protecting a specific minority language. Such accounts may pertain to some social goods, such as peace and security,'" which society in general gains as a result of protecting minority languages. The refinement I have suggested to Raz's distinctions emphasises the instrumental character of such accounts, since under them a specific language is replaceable by other means of acheving the same goal. In the same manner that language rights can be replaced by other means that makes it easier for a person to shift to another culture, language rights are only one of the means that can mitigate conflicts between majority and minority groups. It is not the only means an4 among available means, it is not a necessary means to achieve peace and security in a multilingual society.99
The problem with instrumental interests in a particular language is that they merely point out the cost involved in transferring from one language to another or in using other means in place of language rights.Im Once we eliminate these costs, the interest in using a particular language becomes weak.''' This leads us to the following analysis of the intrinsic value of a particular language.
Reaume stresses the link between language and identity. She argues that language has an intrinsic value as it can constitute a marker of personal identity. One's identity is derived from one's culture. Culture is a marker of identity and language as a central part of culture is itself a marker of identity. Or, to put it in RCaume's words:
98. According to Jacob Levy, providing minorities with language rights contributes to the formation of cross-culture frameworks that can mitigate the conflicts that result from interactions between ethnic or cultural minority groups and majority groups in multilingual societies (Jacob T. Levy Other means can mitigate harsh conflicts between minority groups and majority groups such as temporary economic support or affirmative action, which seek to put the minority and the majority at the same level. 100. Kyrnlicka himself argued that the process of transfemng from one culture to another is a "costly process" (Kymlicka, Multicultrcral Citizenship, supra note 91 at 85-86; see also Will Kymlicka. Conten~porary Political Philosophy: An Introduction3 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 340). 101. The way to eliminate the costs of transferring from one language to another is to put efforts into the process of integrating people who speak a particular language with people who speak a different language. If this process is successfUl and the people who previously spoke only their first language become fluent in a different language. we are left with no reason to protect the original language of these people. However, such a system of integration may not necessarily exist. Therefore, in some cases, instrumental reasons may be strong enough to justify language rights. It would be wrong to dismiss instrumental interests altogether, as they may prove valuable in some cases. However, in other cases, the instrumental interests are not strong enough to justify language rights.
Most people value their language not only instrumentally, a s a tool, but also intrinsically, as a cultural inheritance and as a marker o f identity as a participant in the way o f life it represents. Their language is a repository of the traditions a n d cultural accomplishments o f their community as well as being a kind of cultural accomplishment itself. It is the vehicle through which a community creates a way of life for itself and is intrinsically bound up with that way o f life.lo2
We can find support for Rkaume's observation in current sociolinguistic and anthropological theories, which highlight three interconnected ways in which language constitutes a marker of identity. First, a specific language is an embodiment of cultural concepts. The language of a particular culture is best able to express the interests, values, and world-views of that culture. No language but the one that has been most historically and intimately associated with a given culture is as capable of expressing the particular artefacts and concerns of that culture.'03 An expression in a language refers to a concept in a culture and encapsulates a specific meaning that is grounded in a specific cultural context. It would be more difficult to denote this specific concept in other languages in a way that transfers the entire context and complexity of the original word. Therefore, due to the intimate link between culture and identity, it is difficult for people of a certain culture to truly experience and express their identity in another language.'"" It is not hard to think of examples of words from particular languages, which reflect cultural concepts and are very difficult to translate. For example, the word Assistance to Threatened Languages (Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 199 1) at 2 1 . 104. This understanding of the connection between language and culture is supported by the work of the American anthropologist Benjamin Whorf, who argues that the perception of the world changes from one language to another. What is referred to as Whorf's 'weak hypothesis' emphasizes the role of a particular language as reflecting the concepts of the culture it is associated with: rather than determining these concepts. You may h o w Whorf's hypothesis from his famous example that Eskimo language has many words for snow, because the discrimination between different kinds of snow plays a significant role in Eskimo culture. Press, 1964) . Since my normative argument is based on WhorF's hypothesis, it is usehl to discuss its status in the different disciplines. In political and legal theory, Whorf's hypothesis is regarded as a strong argument for justifying language rights. (See the discussion about Whorf's hypothesis in the context of the connection between language and cultural identity in Daniel Bell, Communitarianism and Its Critics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) at 158-65). Albert Chen also refers to Whorf as a normative source for justifying language rights. Chen compares Whorf's view to the view of Gadamer, who phrases a similar idea that every language is a world view, shaped by the historical tradition embodied in that language. Charles Taylor views language as a basis which makes different social lives possible. Accordingly, the role of a social scientist, such as a political philosopher, is to give meaningful interpretations of these social realities (Charles Taylor, ''Interpretation and the Sciences of Man" in Charles Taylor, Pi~ilosophy and the Htrman Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 15 at 3240). In anthropology, the status of Whorf's hypothesis is pretty well established, and it is also associated with the work of anthropologists Edward Sapir and Franz Boas. There are specific anthropological studies that point 'shivaa' in Hebrew encompasses a wide variety of Jewish mourning rituals after death (which are practiced by secular Jews as well). This word originally comes fi-om the Mishnah (oral Jewish laws) and is part of Jewish religious law (Halacha). When translated to English, this word literally means 'seven'. It takes another few sentences to articulate the correct meaning of the word.lo5 Although every individual phrase can be translated to other languages, the overall complex structure of the language with the intertextual relations between concepts is rooted in a specific cultural context and cannot be translated to another language without a significant part of it being lost. Thus, losing language may mean losing cultural ~oncepts."~ The second way in which a specific language serves as marker of cultural identity is that it serves as the medium of the verbal components of a culture. The connection at a similar conclusion to Whorf's 'weak hypothesis'. For instance, Lutz studies the Ifaluk tribe in Micronesia, and concludes that there are emotions, which are experienced by the Ifaluk and are denoted by words that are not translatable to other languages due to their special cultural context (Catherine A. Lutz, Unnatural Emotions: Eveyday Sentiments on a ~Micronesian Atoll & Their Challenge to Wesfenl Tlzeory (Chicago, 1L: University of Chicago Press, 1988)). Geertz describes a similar notion with regard to Javanese culture and emotions relating to mourning (Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures. strpra note 9 1 at 153). However, there is an anthropological outlook which contends that languages differ from each other in forms and structures but not in the ideas they express (see Eliezer Ben-Rafael, Language, Identi~, and Social Division: The Case of lsrael (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) at 8). In analytic philosophy, a thorough philosophical investigation of the ability of different languages to offer different representations of the world is undertaken by Quine in his discussion of radical translation, which is similar to Whorf's hypothesis (Willard Van O m a n Quine, Worldand Object (Cambridge, M A : M.I.T. Press, 1965) at 51 -57). In linguistics, the status of Whorf's hypothesis is complex. In recent years, Noam Chornsky's theory of a universal grammar, which is common to all languages, has gained dorninance. Chomsky's theory stands in contradiction to Whorf's trend of highlighting the particular characteristics of every language. In addition, although there is an overall consensus among linguists on Whorf's general claim about the connection between language and consciousness, there is disagreement about the validity of Whorf's empirical findings, on which he based his claims (for a summary of the major positions in this debate see George Fletcher, "The Case for Linguistic Self-Defense" in Robert McKim & Jeff McMahan, eds., The Moraliw of Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 324 at 328). 105. Other phrases in Hebrew such as "kit bag question" are taken from the Israeli army experience and are a part of the Hebrew language. Everyone in lsrael knows that a "kit bag question" is a question which should not be asked because it necessarily leads to bad consequences for the one who raises it. (In Israeli military training every soldier has a personal kit bag. One of the training disciplines is running from one place to another in a short period of time. The phrase relates to the situation where a soldier is ordered to run and asks the commander: "with the kit bag"? The only possible answer is: "yes, with the kit bag" and a kit bag is usually very heavy. .. between language and cultural concepts is closely related to a second aspect of language as a marker of identity: components of a particular culture such as songs, prayers, laws, and proverbs are written and expressed by the language associated with that ~u l t u r e . '~' In other words, language is not only a repository of conceptual building blocks for the mind, it is also the medium used to produce cultural texts from building blocks. People therefore value their language which allows distinctive texts that express the uniqueness of their culture.'0s
The third aspect combines the first and the second aspects of language as a marker of cultural identity. When a specific language is embedded with distinctive cultural concepts and serves as a cultural text in itself, it is only natural that persons who speak this language view it as an object of cultural identification. Language has a strong symbolic meaning for people as an expression of their culture. It symbolically represents the particular culture of the people who speak it.'''
The three aspects of language as a marker of identity work together. Language enables the individual to articulate her private feelings and thoughts and to connect them with shared cultural concepts. In this manner, her feelings and thoughts can be understood by members of her cultural community and thus meaninghl social interactions can occur. Cultural texts in a specific language such as literature, songs, and rituals use shared concepts to express more complex and dense ideas. The fact that language reflects its speakers' unique cultural point of view and that it is, in turn, used by them to create texts and rituals is what makes language symbolically important to its speakers and makes it their object of identification.
Up until now I have argued that the interest underpinning language rights is the constituent intrinsic interest in protecting a specific language as a marker of cultural identity of its speakers. However, as I have mentioned, in multilingual states there are several linguistic minorities. All of them may assert that their language is their marker of cultural identity and therefore deserves legal protection of language rights.
In the absence of unlimited resources, the state has to make a moral decision about the minority languages it selects for positive protection. What should be the normative basis for such a decision? How can the state make a distinction between linguistic minorities? In light of Kymlicka's distinction and its critics, I will suggest in the following section an alternative distinction between linguistic minorities based on the constituent intrinsic interest in language as a marker of cultural identity. 
VII. Exclusive Marker of Identity

(i) The Titeoretical Framework of the Exclusive Marker of Identity A rgunren t
When two linguistic minorities such as the Arab and the Russian minorities compete for the same limited public resources, the state has to make the right moral choice between them. I argue that this decision must be made according to the criterion of the strength of the minority's interest in language as a marker of cultural identity.
In the context of limited resources, my argument in this section will thus suggest that the Arab minority has a stronger interest in Arabic as their marker of cultural identity which justifies more protection than the interest of the Russian linguistic minority in Russian as the marker of their cultural identity.
It is important to stress that I do not claim that the Russian minority has no interest in Russian as its marker of cultural identity, or even that it has a weak interest in it. On the contrary, I argue that both linguistic minorities have a very strong interest in their language as a marker of their cultural identity. This is what makes the Israeli linguistic context so intricate and interesting. The question that I will address, in the context of two linguistic minorities with a strong interest in their language, is which language should be supported when there are only enough resources to provide comprehensive support for one minority language? I use the limited resources as an apriori hypothetical assumption, but I leave it open whether such a scenario is desirable or justified in the first p1a~e.l'~ In order to make my argument, I will use the basis of Raz's theory that emphasizes the strength of human interest as justifying legal rights."' The focus on the strength of human interests allows Raz's theory to serve as a basis for awarding language rights on a selective basis. Such basis does not deal with the question of who is entitled to language rights and who is not, but rather who has a stronger case for claiming these rights.
Raz explains that "[tlhe interests are part of the justification of the rights which are part of the justification of the duties"."* Rights are therefore not identical to duties."' A right is only a "ground of a duty, a ground which, if not counteracted by conflicting considerations, justifies holding that other person to have a duty"."4 Considerations that conflict strongly with the interest that justifies a right can show that this right does not exist because its basis is very weak. According to Raz, most conflicting considerations are not strong enough to show that the right does not exist, but they are strong enough to show that the right "successfblly grounds duties only for some of the actions which could promote the interest on which it is based".' Raz's philosophy of rights inherently assumes that there are interests that are stronger and others that are weaker. At the same time, there are also counter considerations which might be strong or weak. I perceive limited resources for supporting all minorities' languages in Israel as considerations that conflict with language rights that are justified by the interest of Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union in protecting Russian, and as considerations that conflict with language rights that are justified by the interest of the Arab minority in protecting Arabic.
Where there is a competition between human interests because of limited resources, the stronger interests are the ones that are capable ofjustifying legal rights which impose more duties on others. The weaker interests are the ones which are less capable of justifying legal rights. Such rights will therefore successfully ground duties only for some of the actions which could promote the interests on which they are based.
In the remainder of this paper I will draw a distinction, on the basis of their strength, between the intrinsic interest of the Arab minority in Arabic as their marker of cultural identity, and the intrinsic interest of the Russian linguistic minority in Russian as a marker of their cultural identity. Because it is based on Reaume's marker of identity interest rather than on Kymlicka's argument of context of choice, my argument will suggest a concrete regulation of language rights in Israel, rather than an obscure resolution. In other words, for the purpose of regulating language rights, it is better to suggest a marker of identity argument, which is based on an interest external to fieedom, rather than relying on Kyrnlicka's freedom-based argument.
As Chaim Gans rightly argues: "freedom, in and of itself, cannot initially serve as a basis for people's interest in their own specific national ~ulture"."~ Although the marker of identity interest does play a role in Kyrnlicka's argument, it plays an 'auxiliary' role to the freedom-based argument, i.e., the context of choice argument, rather than an independent role. By contrast, Reaume's argument is based on the independent interest in language as a marker of identity. The marker of identity argument therefore allows a discussion of the concrete desirable regulation of language rights in Israel. One of the prominent concrete issues that should be addressed in almost every discussion about language rights is the members of which cultural groups are to be accorded language rights. As I have explained above, this decision is inherent to the selective nature of language rights.
The second advantage of my argument is that it does not share the methodological flaws of Kymlicka's argument, as on the one hand, it refers specifically to the particularities of the Israeli case, but on the other hand, it does not use the prevailing empirical account as an established basis for deriving a normative argument. Thus, Cans supports his argument with the example of the right to private property. If this right is to be justified by a freedom-based interest, it is hard to resolve issues concerning its concrete regulation. This is because a person may claim a lot of claims to property that will enhance her freedom. The freedom-based interest does not help to decide which of these claims is justified (ibid. at 41 My argument is that both Hebrew and Russian can potentially serve as objects of identification for the Russian minority. Russian may serve as their object of identification because it is their mother tongue language; Hebrew may serve as their object of identity because it is the historic language of the national and the religious group to which they belong. In other words, both languages may serve as markers of the Russian minority cultural identity. The Russian language serves as a marker of certain aspects of their cultural identity, whereas Hebrew serves as a marker of other aspects of their cultural identity. Hebrew is intimately llnked to their Jewish aspects of cultural identity, such as religon, shared hstory, and most important to their collective national consciousness. Although it is not actively practiced by them in the Diaspora, Hebrew is not an alien language to the Russian Jewish immigrants.
In his well-known book Imagined Communitie~,"~ Benedict Anderson argues that a nation is an imagined community because "the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their comrn~nion".~~~ These communities are tied by collective memories, symbols, and usually a language.
In the case of the Jewish nation, there is no common spoken language which is shared by all the Jews in the world. However, Jews all over the world still irnagme themselves as belonging to one community and culture, which includes a common 117. This kind of immigration is not included in Kymlicka's perception of immigrant minorities. history, traditions and religion. This does not suggest that it is a homogenous culture. On the contrary, there is a lot of diversity within the Jewish culture in the different Diasporas, which includes different variations of religious practices, folklore, costumes, etc. Almost every Jewish community in the world tells the common narratives about the origin and history of the Jewish people. But, in addition, every community has its own narratives about its own particular history. That is to say that the cultural identity of a Jewish person consists of common components with other Jews all over the world, and particular components of his or her specific Jewish c~mmunity."~ In Anderson's terms, Jews all over the world form an imagined community since they regard themselves as belonging to one people although they do not know each other personally. The Hebrew language is not actively used by Jews in the Diasporas but it belongs to the collective heritage of the Jewish people around which Jews imagine themselves as one community.
Some scholars question the assumption that members of different Diasporas in different states and members of the national homeland state share, at least to some extent, one common identity, To put it in David Miller's words: 'Wational identities are not cast in stone".'21 In the context of this paper, the argument is that members of different Diasporas, for example Jews in Egypt and Jews in Russia, do not have much in common and therefore, it is not possible to talk about a single language that may constitute their marker of cultural identity.
In the context of language rights, this argument may be rephrased as the following question: To what extent does a national identity unite people from different Diasporas? And is national identity strong enough to justify the imposition of the national language on members of different Diasporas in their national homeland? Gans' reply to this difficulty is that although the content of the identity may differ in different countries, for example the different Jewish identities in Eastern Europe and North Afnca, this identity is commonly regarded, both by members of the group and by members of other groups, as one continuous national identity which is distinct from any other national identity."' The fact that Jewish national identity is commonly regarded as one continuous national identity which is distinct from any other national identity, leads to the conclusion that Russian immigrants may value two languages as their marker of cultural identity: Russian and Hebrew.
Gans' reply goes hand in hand with the Jewish ways of generating a collective memory. Throughout history, the usual way in which Jewish communities all over the world perpetuated their own historical events, was to incorporate these events into existing mourning days and holidays of the Jewish people. In their collective memory, they regarded these events as part of a general historical pattern of persecution and salvation, which characterized the history of the entire Jewish people in the world.I2' Though the emergence of the Zionist movement was accompanied by an attempt to create a new uniting national identity and collective memory, the original components of the Jewish identity continued to exist and to play a significant role within the new Zionist Jewish identity. '24 This brings me to the point of one's own language as one's own exclusive marker of identity. In general, when dealing with cultural identity claims, the basic assurnption is that people do not choose the culture into which they are born. The intrinsic view of culture, as opposed to the instrumental context of choice view, assumes that people are not really able to choose the culture to which they belong and value as their own culture. Usually, this assumption serves to strengthen their interest in their own culture and particularly in their own language.
However, in the Russian immigrants' case, the fact that they share common cultural components with the dominant Jewish Hebrew-speaking community in Israel, in contrast to the Arab minority, which, as I will argue in the next sub-section, does not share any of these components, weakens their claim to Russian language recognition, at least in comparison to a similar claim by the Arab minority. Or, to put this in short, Arabic is an exclusive marker of identity for the Arab minority, whereas for the Russian minority Russian is not.
My argument should not be viewed as deducing a normative conclusion from empirical data. Rather, this argument appeals to the basis of all human rights-the strength of the interests that justify them. This means that the Russian language should not only not be viewed as an exclusive marker of identity of the Russian immigrants because empirically speaking this is not the case, but because normatively spealung, since the Russian immigrants belong to the Jewish nation, the interest in language as a marker of identity can be at least partly fulfilled by the Hebrew language. This factor weakens the Russian immigrants' interest in support of the Russian language by the Israeli state.
(iii) The Exclusive Marker of Identity of the Arabic Language for the Arab Minority in Israel
The Arab minority in Israel was formed as a result of the Independence War in 1948. Arab and Jewish citizens have been living in CO-existence in Israel since its establishment as a Jewish state. Jews and Arabs regard themselves, and wish to continue regarding themselves, as belonging to different national, cultural and religious groups. In light of the fact that many Arab citizens in Israel perceive themselves as an occupied population in their own homeland, and in light of the ongoing violent conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbours, it is not plausible or possible for the Arab minority to regard Hebrew as their marker of cultural identity. In addition, the fact that Hebrew is also associated with the Zionist movement makes it even harder, or maybe impossible, for the Arabs to identify with Hebrew as their marker of identity. In other words, for them, Arabic is and should be an exclusive marker of identity. Returning now to Raz's rights philosophy, it seems that the interest of the Arab minority in protecting their language is much stronger than the Russian minority interest. Because Arabic expresses an exclusive marker of identity of Israeli Arabs, the interest of Arabs in receiving positive protection for their language is stronger than the interest of Russian Jewish immigrants in receiving the same support for the Russian language.
It is important to stress that the argument of the exclusive marker of identity is not a variation of Kyrnlicka's consent argument. It does not deal with the wishes of people to protect their cultural identity. The significance of cultural identity and the human interest to preserve it are presupposed. I do not argue that by irnrnigrating to Israel the Russian immigrants have expressed an implied consent to totally assimilate in the Israeli culture. Rather, I analyze the different components and modes of associations within their given cultural identity in order to determine the strength of their interest in the Russian language in comparison to the interest of the Arab minority in Arabic. The fact that the Hebrew language is an already existing part of their cultural identity, though dormant, makes it possible for it to serve as their object of cultural identification. This conclusion is irrelevant to the question whether by immigrating to Israel they have expressed consent to abandon their Russian identity.
Therefore, if, due to limited resources, language rights have to be selectively applied in Israel, Arabic is the first language that should be comprehensively supported because the interest in supporting it is the strongest one.
VIII. Conclusion
In this paper I have discussed Kymlicka's account of the minority languages that should be selected for protection by language rights. After discussing the similarities between Barak C.J.'s distinction in Adalah and Kymlicka's distinction I have claimed that Kymlicka's distinction between immigrant and national minorities has many empirical, moral and methodological flaws.
I have used the specifics of the Israeli linguistic case to demonstrate the problems in Kymlicka's distinction and draw an alternative distinction. In the specific Israeli context, in which the Russian minority constitutes a linguistic minority that forms a semi-societal culture and has a strong connection to its language, Kymlicka's distinction is not relevant.
I have analyzed the instrumental and intrinsic interests that underpin language rights. I have argued that the intrinsic interest in one's own language as one's own marker of cultural identity is the strongest interest that justifies legal rights to protect a particular minority language. I have pointed out the selective character of language rights that in the absence of unlimited resources can only protect certain minority languages.
I have suggested a different distinction that is based on the strength of the intrinsic interest of minority members in their language as a marker of their cultural identity.
I have applied this distinction in the Israeli context and argued that because Arabic constitutes an exclusive marker of the cultural identity of Arab citizens in Israel, their interest in receiving positive support for their language from the Israeli government is stronger than the interest of Russian immigrants to receive the same support. Since it is based on the intrinsic value of language as a marker of cultural identity, I believe that my distinction, or variations of it, may prove useful in analysing similar dilemmas in other cases as well.
